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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the justiﬁed knowledge operator J with the intended meaning of J as ‘there is a justiﬁcation for .’
Though justiﬁed knowledge appears here in a case study of common knowledge systems, a similar approach is applicable in more
general situations. First we consider evidence-based common knowledge systems obtained by augmenting a multi-agent logic of
knowledge with a system of evidence assertions t:, reﬂecting the notion ‘t is an evidence for ,’ such that evidence is respected by
all agents. Justiﬁed common knowledge is obtained by collapsing all evidence terms into one modality J. We show that in standard
situations, when the base epistemic systems are T, S4, and S5, the resulting justiﬁed common knowledge systems are normal modal
logics, which places them within the scope of well-developed machinery applicable to modal logic: Kripke-style epistemic models,
normalized proofs, automated proof search, etc. In the aforementioned situations, the intended semantics of justiﬁed knowledge
is supported by a realization theorem stating that for any valid fact about justiﬁed knowledge, one could recover its constructive
meaning by realizing all occurrences of justiﬁed knowledge modalities J by appropriate evidence terms t:.
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1. Introduction
Plato’s celebrated tripartite deﬁnition of knowledge as justiﬁed true belief is generally regarded as a set of
necessary conditions for the possession of knowledge. Due to Hintikka (cf. [23]), the ‘true belief’ components of
Plato’s deﬁnition of knowledge have been fairly formalized by means of modal logic and its possible world semantics.
Building on earlier works [6,18], the papers [9,10] introduced the notion of justiﬁcation into formal epistemology
by combining Hintikka-style epistemic modal logic with justiﬁcation calculi arising from the logic of proofs [4–6].
Epistemic logic with justiﬁcation, along with the usual knowledge operator F (F is known), contains assertions t:F
(t is a justiﬁcation for F ). A natural epistemic semantics for epistemic logic with justiﬁcation was provided by Fitting
models which augment Kripke models with a natural treatment of justiﬁcation assertions t:F based on a special function
specifying admissible evidence for each formula in a given world.
Common knowledge is a fundamental feature of multi-agent systems of knowledge which was ﬁrst discussed in [30]
and then studied in [11,21,27,32]. The book [17] provides an excellent introduction to logics of knowledge in general
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and to common knowledge phenomena in particular. Let K1,K2, . . . , Kn stand for knowledge operators in an n-agent
logic of knowledge and
E = K1 ∧ K2 ∧ · · · ∧ Kn.
Then the common knowledge operator C corresponding to K1,K2, . . . , Kn is informally deﬁned as an inﬁnite con-
junction
C ⇔  ∧ E ∧ E2 ∧ · · · ∧ Em . . . .
In a Kripke-style model for K1,K2, . . . , Kn the common knowledge operator is formally deﬁned as the modality of
reachability along paths that use accessibility edges corresponding to any of K1,K2, . . . , Kn. The traditional way to
capture common knowledge deductively is to use the Fixed-Point Axiom
C ↔ E( ∧ C)
along with the Induction Rule
→E( ∧ )
→C ,
capturing the greatest solution of the corresponding ﬁxed-point equation (cf. [17]). This kind of deductive system does
not behave well proof-theoretically. In particular, there is no conventional cut-elimination in the common-knowledge
systems [1]. This practically rules out automated proof search and limits the usage of formal methods in analyzing
knowledge. Semi-formal model theoretical methods in this area have their own problems, both foundational and
practical. For example, paradigmatic solutions of well-known puzzles like Muddy Children, Wise Men, Unfaithful
Wives, etc. (cf. [17]), use a very strong, not formalized assumption that the agents possess a common knowledge of
the same Kripke-style frame of possible situations.
The language of modal logic captures the most liberal version of the knowledge operator without imposing any
conditions on the way this knowledge is attained. As a result, there might be non-constructive versions of knowledge
appearing by chance or for some unknown reason or without any particular reasons at all. That is why the notion
of justiﬁcation has received much attention in epistemology (cf., for example, [12,19,20,22,28,29,31,36,41]). This
suggests that there is a certain need for formal evidence-based knowledge systems, in particular for analyzing social
situations.
In this paper we introduce a family of new knowledge operators representing so-called evidence-based knowledge
(EBK ). An EBK-system is obtained by augmenting a multi-agent logic of knowledge with a system of evidence
assertions t: (‘t is an evidence for ’) based on the following plausible assumptions:
• all axioms have evidence;
• evidence is undeniable and implies individual knowledge of any agent;
• evidence is checkable;
• evidence is monotone, i.e., new evidence does not spoil existing one.
An important feature of EBK-systems is their graceful handling of the logical omniscience problem: an agent cannot
claim to have evidence-based knowledge without having actually built a supporting evidence term.
Finally, for a given EBK-system, we introduce the justiﬁed knowledge operator J (‘there is a justiﬁcation for ’)
obtained by collapsing all evidence terms into one modality J:
t: −→ J.
The resulting justiﬁed knowledge systems (TJn , S4Jn , and S5Jn ) are normal modal logics with natural epistemic Kripke-
style semantics.Moreover, for any valid fact inTJn ,S4Jn , orS5Jn , one could recover its constructivemeaning by realizing
all forgetful modalities J by appropriate evidence terms t:.
Here is a brief comparison of the justiﬁed common knowledge operator J with the common knowledge operator
C. Informally
J ⇒  ∧ E ∧ E2 ∧ · · · ∧ En . . . ,
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but the converse ‘⇐’ does not necessarily hold. Such a J is not necessarily unique, which means that we have a
variety of interpretations for a justiﬁed knowledge operator. In the epistemic Kripke-style semantics, J corresponds
to any accessibility relation which contains (but does not necessarily coincide with) reachability. Again, there might
be many choices for such accessibility relation in a given model.
Justiﬁed common knowledge logics postulate J as a normal (here S4-like) modality. In particular, this sufﬁces to
validate the Fixed-Point Axiom for J:
J ↔ E( ∧ J).
The Induction Rule is not valid for J. This means that, unlike common knowledge, justiﬁed common knowledge is not
committed to capturing the greatest solution of the corresponding ﬁxed-point equation, but rather represents its generic
solution.
In paradigmatic examples where common knowledge has been used, justiﬁed common knowledge is also applicable.
Moreover, justiﬁed common knowledge may have certain advantages.
1. An axiomatic approach in the form of justiﬁed common knowledge seems to avoid foundational loopholes of
the standard model-theoretical reasoning about common knowledge. In particular, its application does not rely on a
non-formalized assumption of common knowledge of a speciﬁc epistemic model; this assumption is normally neither
acknowledged nor formalized; nor does it appear to be well-justiﬁed. Within an axiomatic approach, one lists all
epistemic assumptions formally, which provides a more trustworthy and complete solution. Formalized solutions can
be easier to analyze, verify, and optimize.
2. Justiﬁed common knowledge systems are simpler than the traditional common knowledge systems. Justiﬁed
common knowledge is in the scope of well-developed methods in modal logic, e.g., proof theoretic. These include
cut-elimination theorems that yield the possibility of automated proof search and veriﬁcation. 1
3. The common-knowledge operator is a derivative of the agent knowledge operators and carries the features of the
latter. The justiﬁed common knowledge component can be chosen independently of knowledge systems of individual
agents, which provides an additional degree of ﬂexibility.
2. The content of this paper
Evidence based knowledge systems, along with the usual knowledge modalities, contain evidence assertions of the
format ‘t is evidence for ,’ denoted as t:. There are a variety of formal systems for describing evidence which could
serve as a formal base for the ‘evidence component’ here. The ﬁrst system of explicit terms capturing a modal logic,
S4, was found in [5,6] and known as the Logic of Proofs LP. Similar systems corresponding to S5 were introduced in
[7,37,38]. Finally, [13,14] describes systems of terms corresponding to K, K4, T, D, and D4. These systems of explicit
terms share several important features. Among these is the ability to internalize their own proofs as schematized by the
Internalization Principle:
if , then p: for some proof term p.
the Realization Theorem holds for the aforementioned systems, which asserts that one can retrieve explicit evidence
terms from the proof of any theorem provable in the underlying modal logic. As a result, the forgetful projection of the
logic of explicit terms is exactly the counterpart modal logic, e.g., S4 is the forgetful projection of LP. There are also
other systems of explicit presentation of knowledge by evidence terms (‘+’-free fragment of LP, [6,18], functional
logic of proofs [25,26], etc.), where compatibility of evidence is not required.
Along with the usual choices of K, T, K4, S4, and S5 for base logics of knowledge of individual agents, this shows
that the number of possible EBK-systems is rather high. We consider three representative cases, all using the logic
of proofs LP as their evidence component: TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP. In all these systems, the evidence logic is LP
(which corresponds to S4), whereas the base knowledge logics could be weaker (T in TnLP), equal to (S4 in S4nLP),
or stronger than (S5 in S5nLP) the evidence logic. All these EBK-systems are supplied with epistemic semantics
capturing the notion of admissible evidence.
1 Some experimentation with automated proof search in justiﬁed knowledge systems were made in [16]. In particular, a computer automatically
found a proof of the Muddy Children problem (cf. [17, Section 2.3]).
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We also consider logics of justiﬁed common knowledge (JCK ) corresponding to the above EBK-systems: TJn , S4Jn ,
and S5Jn obtained from TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP, respectively, by collapsing
t: → J.
The intended epistemic semantics of J is ‘there is a justiﬁcation for.’ The JCK-systemsTJn ,S4Jn , andS5Jn are normal
modal logics with standard Kripke-style semantics. We show that TJn , S4Jn , and S5Jn enjoy an important realization
property: given a formula  in the JCK-language derivable in TJn , S4Jn , or S5Jn , one could recover an EBK-formula 
derivable in the corresponding EBK-system TnLP, S4nLP, or S5nLP, respectively, such that  is a forgetful projection
of . The realization property opens a possibility of ﬁrst establishing  in a JCK-system TJn , S4Jn , or S5Jn , which can
be a relatively easy task, and then recovering constructive evidence terms encoded by justiﬁed knowledge modality J
in , if needed.
We make an easy but fundamental observation that evidence assertions t :, as well as the justiﬁed knowledge
modality J , satisfy the Fixed-Point Axiom above and hence may be regarded as a special constructive sort of common
knowledge. In terms of accessibility relations in Kripke-style models, J corresponds to a transitive and reﬂexive
relation R containing (but not necessarily coinciding with) the reachability relation. As was shown in [3], TJn and
S4Jn coincide with McCarthy’s ‘any fool knows’ common knowledge systems (cf. [32]). This observation provides
McCarthy’s dummy ‘any fool’ agent with a evidence-based epistemic semantics.
On the technical side, we prove that TJn and S4Jn enjoy cut-elimination theorems and give algorithms of recovering
evidence terms in JCK-modalities in all three forgetful systems TJn , S4Jn , and S5Jn . We also ﬁnd epistemic models for
each of the three systems above and establish the corresponding completeness theorems.
In Section 7, we give a complete account of the correspondence between justiﬁed common knowledge J and
common knowledge C. A general answer here is that the JCK approach to common knowledge leads to a stronger
modality but leaner axiom systems. Whenever such a comparison is appropriate, JCK-modality J is stronger than the
common knowledge modality C:
J ⇒ C but C J.
Each valid JCK-identity is common knowledge-compliant, which justiﬁes using JCK-systems as common knowledge
systems. In particular, (S4Jn )∗ ⊂ S4Cn but (S4Jn )∗ 
= S4Cn , where ∗ stands for an operation of renaming J to C.
Our experience says that JCK-systems are applicable andmayprovide additional insightswhenever the usual common
knowledge systems are. As an example, a solution of the Wise Men puzzle (Section 8) is given as a formal derivation
in TJ3 .
3. Formal systems of evidence-based knowledge
We ﬁrst introduce the multi-agent logics of the evidence based knowledge series TnLP, n = 1, 2, 3, . . . . In brief,
TnLP contains n copies of T-style modalities representing knowledge operators of n agents, K1, . . . , Kn (cf. systems
Tn from [17]); in addition, it contains a system of evidence assertions taken from the logic of proofs LP.
Evidence assertions in TnLP have the form t:, where is a formula and t is an evidence term (or just evidence) built
from evidence constants a, b, c, . . . and evidence variables x, y, z, . . . with the help of three operations, application ‘·’
(binary), union ‘+’ (binary), and inspection ‘!’ (unary). Formally, if t is an evidence and S is a sentence variable, the
formulas of TnLP are deﬁned by the following grammar:
 = ⊥|S|1→2|1 ∧ 2|1 ∨ 2|¬|Ki|t:.
We assume also that ‘t :( ),’ ‘Ki ,’ and ‘¬’ bind stronger than ‘∧,∨’ which, in turn, bind stronger than ‘→.’ TnLP has
axioms of both Tn and LP, together with the principle that an evidence assertion yields knowledge of each individual
agent: t:→Ki. This is a schema when there is one growing system of evidence accepted by all the agents.
Deﬁnition 1. Axioms and rules of TnLP are:
(I) Classical propositional logic
The standard set of axioms of the classical propositional logic, e.g., A1–A10 from [24] or a similar system
R1. Modus Ponens.
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(II) Knowledge principles (axioms and rules of T for each Ki)
B1i . Ki(→)→(Ki→Ki),
B2i . Ki→,
R2i .  ⇒ Ki.
(III) Evidence principles (axioms and rules of the logic of proofs LP)
E1. s:(→)→(t:→(s ·t):) (application),
E2. t: →!t:(t:) (inspection),
E3. s:→(s+t):, t:→(s+t): (sum),
E4. t:→ (reﬂexivity),
R3. (rule of constant speciﬁcation)  c:A, where A is an axiom from (I)–(IV) and c is a constant.
(IV) Principle connecting evidence and knowledge
C1. t:→Ki (undeniability of evidence).
Group (III) introduces some combinatorial properties of evidence and explains the meaning of evidence terms. E1
is merely the internalized modus ponens, which says that an evidence for → can be applied to an evidence for  to
produce an evidence for . E2 expresses the principle that any evidence t of  can be veriﬁed by a new evidence !t (this
is similar to a proof checking principle in the logic of proofs). E3 reﬂects the principle of consistency and monotonicity
of evidence: if t is an evidence for , then t combined with any other evidence still remains an evidence for . R3
assigns initial evidence in the form of constants to any axiom of TnLP. This is a formal representation of the basic
assumption in evidence-based logics that all axioms have been certiﬁed and their justiﬁcations have been accepted by
all the agents. Finally, E4 is redundant and immediately follows from B2i and C1. Naturally, all axioms are in fact
schemas in the language of TnLP. All rules are applied across sections (I)–(IV).
Consider two more series of principles:
B3i . Ki→KiKi (positive introspection),
B4i . ¬Ki→Ki¬Ki (negative introspection).
System S4nLP is obtained from TnLP by adding B3i and S5nLP is S4nLP plus B4i , i = 1, . . . , n. Again, all the rules
R2i are extended to these new axioms as well. All these systems are closed under substitutions of evidence terms for
evidence variables and formulas for propositional variables, and enjoy the deduction theorem ,  ⇒  →.
Lemma 1. For any formula  and each i = 1, 2, . . . , n there is an evidence term upi (x) such that TnLP (hence
S4nLP and S5nLP) proves x:→upi (x):Ki.
Proof.
1. x:→Ki, by C1;
2. a:(x:→Ki), introducing evidence a, by R3;
3. !x:x:→(a·!x):Ki, by E1 and propositional logic;
4. x:→!x:x:, by E2;
5. x:→(a·!x):Ki, by propositional logic.
It sufﬁces now to set upi (x) equal to a·!x such that a:(x:→Ki). 
Proposition 1 (Internalization). Given TnLP , there is an evidence term p such that TnLP p:. The same holds
for S4nLP and S5nLP.
Proof. Induction on a derivation of . Base:  is an axiom. Then use R3. In this case, p is an atomic evidence
(a constant). Induction step:
(1)  is obtained from →  and  by modus ponens. By the Induction Hypothesis,  s :(→ ) and  t : for
some evidence terms s and t. Hence by E1,  (s ·t):, so p is s ·t .
(2) If is obtained by R2i , then is Ki and . By the Induction Hypothesis,  t: for some evidence t. Use Lemma
1 to conclude that  upi (t):Ki, and p is upi (t).
(3) If  is obtained by R3, then  is c:A for some constant c and axiom A. Use the axiom E2 to derive !c:c:A, i.e., !c:.
Here p is !c.
Note that the evidence term p is ground and built from atomic evidence terms by applications and inspections only. 
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A similar argument establishes a more general form of internalization: If 1, . . . ,k , then for some evidence
term p(x1, . . . , xk),
x1:1, . . . , xk:k p(x1, . . . , xk):.
Both of the previous formulations of internalization follow from the Proposition 2 which holds for TnLP, S4nLP, and
S5nLP.
Proposition 2 (Lifting). If 1, . . . ,k, y1:1, . . . , ym:m , then for some term p(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , ym),
x1:1, . . . , xk:k, y1:1, . . . , ym:m p(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , ym):.
Proof. Similar to Proposition 1 with two new base clauses. If  is i , then p is xi . If  is yj:, then p is !yj . 
The internalization property states that all derived facts have witnesses. Internalization naturally extends to the case
when TnLP, S4nLP, or S5nLP are augmented by new axioms, each of which has witnessing evidence (e.g., has the
form t: for some evidence t).
Lemma 2. For any formula  and each i = 1, 2, . . . , n there is an evidence term downi (x) such that TnLP proves
x:Ki→downi (x):. The same holds for S4nLP and S5nLP.
Proof. x:Ki→, by E4 and B2i ;
b:(x:Ki→), introducing evidence b, by Proposition 1;
!x:x:Ki→(b·!x):, by E1 and propositional logic;
x:Ki→!x:x:Ki, y E2;
x:Ki→(b·!x):, by propositional logic.
It sufﬁces now to set downi (x) equal to b·!x such that b:(x:Ki→). 
A natural assumption about common knowledge is that  is common knowledge (written C) iff all agents know
that  and C. This leads to the Fixed-Point Axiom (cf. [17]):
C ↔ E( ∧ C),
where E = K1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kn. We show that t : provably satisﬁes a similar ﬁxed-point identity in TnLP, S4nLP,
and S5nLP.
Proposition 3. For each evidence term t, t: satisﬁes the Fixed-Point Axiom in TnLP(S4nLP,S5nLP).
Proof. We prove that TnLP  t: ↔ E( ∧ t:).
1. t:→Ki, for all i = 1, . . . , n; hence t:→E;
2. t:→!t:t:; hence t:→Kit:, for all i = 1, . . . , n, and t:→ Et:;
3. t:→E( ∧ t:);
which concludes the left-to-right part of the proof. The right-to-left part E(∧ t:)→ t: follows from the reﬂexivity
of E. 
4. Models
Arithmetical provability semantics for the logic of proofs LP was introduced in [5,6] and extended to evidence-based
knowledge systems in [8]. Kripke-style models for modal logics of provability and explicit proofs were considered in
[4] and then generalized in [8,34,35,39,42]. Epistemic Kripke-based semantics for the logic of proofs was suggested
by Fitting (cf. [18]).
At the heart of this semantics lies the idea, which can be traced back to Mkrtychev’s [33], of augmenting
Boolean (Mkrtychev) or Kripke-style (Fitting) models by an evidence function which indicates which terms
are ‘admissible’ as an evidence to a given statement. The statement t : holds in a given world u iff both of
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the following conditions are met:
(1) t is an admissible evidence for  in u;
(2)  holds in all worlds accessible from u.
Fitting models were adapted for single-agent evidence-based knowledge systems in [8–10]. In this section, we gener-
alize Fitting semantics to capture multi-agent EBK-systems TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP; the aforementioned Kripke,
Mkrtychev, and Fitting models will be special cases of this semantics. A new feature of these models is a designated
evidence accessibility relation.
ATnLP-frame is a structure (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R), whereW is a non-empty set of states ( possible worlds);R1, . . . , Rn
are binary relations on W called accessibility relations, associated with agents 1, . . . , n, respectively; and R is a binary
evidence accessibility relation onW. The relations R1, . . . , Rn are reﬂexive, R is reﬂexive and transitive, and R contains
all Ri’s. Hence R contains the transitive closure of R1 ∪ · · · ∪ Rn, but does not necessarily coincide with it. In other
words, if v is reachable from u by a ﬁnite number of R1, . . . , Rn-edges, then uRv, but the converse is not necessarily
true.
Given a frame (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R), a possible evidence function E is a mapping from states and evidence terms to
sets of formulas. We can read  ∈ E(u, t) as ‘ is one of the formulas for which t serves as possible evidence in state
u’. An evidence function must obey conditions that respect the intended meanings of the operations on evidence terms.
Deﬁnition 2. E is an evidence function on (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R) if for all evidence terms s and t, for all formulas  and
, and for all u, v ∈ W :
(1) Monotonicity: uRv implies E(u, t) ⊆ E(v, t).
(2) Application: → ∈ E(u, s) and  ∈ E(u, t) implies  ∈ E(u, s ·t).
(3) Inspection:  ∈ E(u, t) implies t: ∈ E(u, !t).
(4) Sum: E(u, s) ∪ E(u, t) ⊆ E(u, s + t).
A TnLP-model is a structure M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R,E,  ), where E is an evidence function on the frame
(W,R1, . . . , Rn, R) and  is an arbitrary mapping from sentence variables to subsets of W. Given a model M =
(W,R1, . . . , Rn, R,E,  ), a forcing relation  is extended from sentence variables to all formulas by the following
rules. For each u ∈ W :
(1)  respects Boolean connectives at each world.
(2) uKi iff v for every v ∈ W with uRiv.
(3) u t: iff  ∈ E(u, t) and v for every v ∈ W with uRv.
Informally speaking, t: is true at a given world u iff t is an acceptable evidence for  in u and  is true at all worlds v
accessible from u via a given evidence accessibility relation R. We say  is true at world u ∈ W if u; otherwise, 
is false at u. A formula  is true in a model if  is true at each world of the model;  is valid if  is true in every model.
A constant speciﬁcation is a map CS from evidence constants to (possibly empty) sets of axioms. A constant
speciﬁcation CS is full if it entails internalization (Proposition 1). The proof of Proposition 1 demonstrates that for a
constant speciﬁcation to be full, it is sufﬁcient to have a constant for each axiom. Given a constant speciﬁcation CS, a
model M meets CS if M  a: whenever  ∈ CS(a). A derivation (in any of TnLP, S4nLP, or S5nLP) meets CS if
whenever rule R3 is used to produce a:, then  ∈ CS(a).
S4nLP- and S5nLP-models are deﬁned as TnLP-models with only this difference: for S4nLP-models, the acces-
sibility relations R1, . . . , Rn are reﬂexive and transitive; in S5nLP-models, R1, . . . , Rn are reﬂexive, transitive, and
symmetric. A set S of formulas is CS-S4nLP-satisﬁable (CS-TnLP-satisﬁable, CS-S5nLP-satisﬁable) if there is an
S4nLP-model (TnLP-model, S5nLP-models) M , meeting CS, and containing a world u such that M,u for all
 ∈ S.
The usual Kripke models for Tn, S4n, and S5n are TnLP-, S4nLP-, and S5nLP-models, respectively, where the
evidence part (R and E) is ignored. Mkrtychev models 2 for LP are single-world TnLP-models. Fitting models 3 for
LPS4 are S41LP-models with R1 = R. Kripke models for S41LP + weak negative introspection ¬t :→(¬t :)
from [8] are S41LP-models with R = W × W .
2 Called pre-models in [33].
3 Called weak models in [18].
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Theorem 1 (Completeness Theorem). Let CS be a constant speciﬁcation. A formula  is provable in TnLP (S4nLP,
S5nLP) meeting CS iff  holds in all TnLP-models (respectively, S4nLP-models, S5nLP-models) meeting CS.
Proof. We will give a proof for S4nLP making note of how to modify this proof for the remaining cases of TnLP and
S5nLP.
Soundness is straightforward; we will check t:→Ki (axiom C1) only. Suppose u t:, then v for all v such
that uRv. Since Ri ⊆ R, v for all v such that uRiv; hence uKi.
Completeness is proved using a maximal consistent set construction properly adapted for evidence-based multi-agent
systems. A set of formulas  is consistent if there is no ﬁnite subset 1, . . . ,n such that ¬(1 ∧ · · · ∧n) is provable
in S4nLP meeting CS. A consistent set  is maximal consistent if for any formula , either  ∈  or ¬ ∈ . By the
standard Lindenbaum construction, each consistent set can be extended to a maximal consistent set.
We deﬁne the canonical model M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R,E,  ) for S4nLP with a given constant speciﬁcation CS.
W is the collection of all maximal consistent sets. If is a set of formulas, leti = {|Ki ∈ } and = {|t: ∈ }.
Now deﬁne the accessibility relations R1, . . . , Rn, R as follows:
Ri iff i ⊆ , i = 1, . . . , n; R iff  ⊆ .
Note that Ri are reﬂexive and transitive (for S4nLP). For S5nLP, relations Ri are also symmetric. Suppose Ri and
Ki ∈ . We claim that Ki ∈ ; hence  ∈  and Ri. Indeed, suppose Ki /∈ , then by maximality, ¬Ki ∈ .
By the axiom ¬Ki→Ki¬Ki, Ki¬Ki ∈ . Since Ri, ¬Ki ∈ , which contradicts the consistency of .
Note that R is reﬂexive too. Moreover, R is transitive. Indeed, let R and R. If t : ∈ , then !t :t : ∈  and
t: ∈ . Likewise, !t:t: ∈  and t: ∈ . By reﬂexivity,  ∈ . Let us check that R contains all Ri’s, i = 1, . . . , n.
Suppose Ri and t: ∈ . Then !t:t: ∈  and Kit: ∈ ; hence t: ∈ . By reﬂexivity,  ∈ .
Deﬁne the evidence function E as follows:
E(, t) = {|t: ∈ }.
To show thatE is an evidence function, wemust prove that it satisﬁes conditions ofDeﬁnition 2.Application, Inspection,
and Sum are straightforward. For Monotonicity, assume  ∈ E(, t), i.e., t: ∈ , and R. Again, !t:t: ∈ ; hence
t: ∈ , i.e.,  ∈ E(, t).
Finally, the forcing relation is deﬁned canonically, i.e., for each sentence variable S we stipulate  S iff S ∈  .
Lemma 3 (Truth Lemma).  iff  ∈ .
Proof. By induction on . The base and Boolean cases are standard. Consider modalities K1, . . . , Kn. If Ki ∈ ,
and Ri, then  ∈ . By the Induction Hypothesis, ; hence Ki.
If Ki /∈ , then ′ = i ∪ {¬} is consistent. Otherwise 1 ∧ 2 ∧ · · · ∧ l → would be provable for some
Ki1,Ki2, . . . , Kil ∈ ; hence Ki1 ∧ Ki2 ∧ · · · ∧ Kil →Ki would also be provable, which would make 
inconsistent. Let  be a maximal consistent set containing ′. Then Ri, ¬ ∈ ; hence  /∈  and, by the Induction
Hypothesis, , which yields Ki.
Now consider the last remaining case of the Truth Lemma:  = t :. Let t : ∈ . Then, by the deﬁnition of
the evidence function,  ∈ E(, t). It remains to be shown that  for all ’s such that R. Take such a . By
Monotonicity of the evidence function, t: ∈ . By reﬂexivity, ∈ . By the Induction Hypothesis,. Conversely,
if  t:, then  ∈ E(, t) and t: ∈  by the deﬁnition of the evidence function E. 
It is easy to see now that M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R,E,  ) is an S4nLP-model meeting constant speciﬁcation CS.
Indeed, by the deﬁnition of a consistent set, CS ⊆ , for each  ∈ W . By Truth Lemma 3, CS.
Let us ﬁnish the proof of Theorem 1. If  is not provable in S4nLP meeting constant speciﬁcation CS, then M is a
countermodel for : consider {¬}, which is consistent, and hence contains in a maximal consistent set . By Truth
Lemma 3, . 
5. Compactness and Fully Explanatory property
The above models satisfy the following compactness property, ﬁrst noticed for canonical models of LP in [18].
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Proposition 4 (Compactness). For a given constant speciﬁcation CS, a set of formulas U is CS-S4nLP-(CS-TnLP-,
CS-S5nLP-)satisﬁable iff any ﬁnite subset of U is CS-S4nLP-(CS-TnLP-, CS-S5nLP-)satisﬁable.
Proof. Suppose any ﬁnite subset of U is CS-S4nLP-satisﬁable. We will ﬁnd a world  in the canonical CS-S4nLP-
model such thatU . First, note thatU is a consistent set. Otherwise, for someX1, . . . , Xm ∈ U ,CS-S4nLP ¬(X1∧
· · · ∧ Xm), which would make {X1, . . . , Xm} a ﬁnite unsatisﬁable subset of U, which is impossible. Extend U to a
maximal consistent set , which is hence a world in the canonical CS-S4nLP-model. Since U ⊆ , by Truth Lemma
3, U . 
The Fully Explanatory property of the canonical models for the logic of proofs was introduced by Fitting in [18].
This property might be summarized as ‘whatever is known is known for a reason.’
Deﬁnition 3. An S4nLP-(TnLP-, S5nLP-)model is Fully Explanatory provided that, whenever v for every v such
that uRv, then for some evidence term t we have u t:.
Proposition 5 (Fully Explanatory property). For any full constant speciﬁcation CS, the canonical CS-S4nLP-(CS-
TnLP-, CS-S5nLP-)model is Fully Explanatory.
Proof. The proof follows Fitting’s [18]. We establish the contrapositive. Let t: /∈  for each evidence term t. Consider
a set U =  ∪ {¬}. We claim that U is consistent. Otherwise, for some t1 :1, t2 :2, . . . , tk :k ∈ , CS-S4nLP
proves 1→(2 →(3→· · ·→) · · ·). Since CS is a full constant speciﬁcation, there is an evidence term s such that
CS-S4nLP proves s:(1→(2 →(3→· · ·→) · · ·)). Using E1, we establish that CS-S4nLP proves
t1:1→(t2:2 →(t3:3→· · ·→(st1t2 . . . tk):) . . .).
Hence (st1t2 . . . tk): ∈ , which contradicts the assumption about .
Now take  to be a maximal consistent extension of U. It is clear that  is a world in a canonical model and that
R. By Truth Lemma 3, . 
6. Justiﬁed knowledge
In this section, we introduce a light version of evidence-based knowledge, which we call justiﬁed knowledge, in the
form of a new modal operator J (read  is justiﬁed) which is the forgetful projection of evidence assertions t:. In
the spirit of this paper, we consider an axiomatic description ﬁrst.
Deﬁnition 4. The language of justiﬁed common knowledge is a modal language with n+1 modalities K1, . . . , Kn, J .
Systems TJn , S4Jn , and S5Jn are speciﬁed as Tn, S4n, and S5n, with the modalities K1, . . . , Kn augmented by S4 with
the modality J, together with the principle: for all i = 1, . . . , n
J→Ki.
Apparently, the dummy (n + 1)st agent corresponding to J plays the role of a sceptical S4-agent who accepts facts
only if they are supplied with checkable evidence. On the other hand, this agent is trusted by all other agents and is
capable of internalizing and inspecting any fact actually proven in the system. As was noticed in [2,3], TJn and S4Jn
correspond to McCarthy’s systems with the ‘any fool knows’ modality (cf. [32]).
Lemma 4. In each of TJn , S4Jn , and S5Jn ,
KiJ ↔ J ↔ JKi.
Proof. Immediate from Ki-reﬂexivity and the following derivations.
J→JJ→KiJ;
J→JJ→JKi;
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KiJ→J;
Ki→, J (Ki→), JKi→J. 
Proposition 6. Justiﬁed common knowledge J satisﬁes the Fixed-Point Axiom in each of TJn , S4Jn , and S5Jn .
Proof. Deriving the Fixed-Point identity for J in TJn (hence in S4Jn and S5Jn )
J ↔ E( ∧ J)
is similar to Proposition 3. 
Deﬁnition 5. TJn -models are Kripke models for (n + 1)-agent modal logics with a frame (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R), where
W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R1, . . . , Rn are reﬂexive accessibility relations on W associated to operators
K1, . . . , Kn, respectively, R is a reﬂexive transitive relation on W, and Ri ⊆ R for all i = 1, . . . , n. As usual, a forcing
relation  is an arbitrary mapping from propositional letters to subsets of W, which is extended from propositional
letters to all formulas by the usual modal rules. S4Jn -models are those where R1, . . . , Rn are reﬂexive and transitive.
S5Jn -models are those with reﬂexive, transitive, and symmetric R1, . . . , Rn.
Proposition 7. TJn (S4Jn ,S5Jn ) is sound for TJn -models (S4Jn -models, S5Jn -models).
Proof. The usual modal axioms are valid by our choice of accessibility relations. J→Ki is trivially guaranteed by
Ri ⊆ R. Indeed, let u J and uRiv. Then uRv also holds, which brings u. Hence, uKi. 
Completeness also occurs. For TJn and S4Jn , this will follow from Theorem 3 below. The completeness of S5Jn will
be established in Theorem 5.
Deﬁnition 6. A sequent is a pair of ﬁnite sets of S4Jn -formulas presented as  ⇒ . To simplify proofs, we assume
a Boolean basis→,⊥ and treat the remaining Boolean connectives as deﬁnable. Axioms of S4JnG are the sequents
S ⇒ S and ⊥ ⇒, where S is a propositional variable. The propositional rules of S4JnG are those from the classical
propositional Gentzen-style system, including Weakening and Cut (cf. [40]). In addition, there are n+1 pairs of proper
modal rules:
, ⇒ 
(,⇒)
, ⇒  and
J, ⇒ 
(⇒,) ,
J, ⇒ 
where  ∈ {K1, . . . , Kn, J } and {1, . . . ,m} = {1, . . . ,m}.
The Gentzen-style version TJnG of TJn has the same rules as S4JnG with the (⇒,) rule replaced by
J, ⇒ 
(⇒,).
J, ⇒ 
Theorem 2 (Equivalence of Gentzen- and Hilbert-style systems).  ⇒  is provable in S4JnG(TJnG) iff
∧
→∨
is provable in S4Jn (TJn ).
Proof. The part ‘only if,’ i.e., that S4JnG  ⇒  yields S4Jn 
∧
→∨, is a standard exercise in modal derivation.
Let us check the soundness of the (⇒,)-rule in S4JnG. By the Induction Hypothesis,
S4Jn 
∧
J ∧∧→.
By S4-reasoning,
S4Jn 
∧
J→(∧→).
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By Lemma 4,
S4Jn 
∧
J→(∧→).
Use distribution to establish
S4Jn 
∧
J→(∧→).
By S4-reasoning,
S4Jn 
∧
J→(∧→);
hence
S4Jn 
∧
J ∧∧→.
Let us now check the soundness of the (⇒,)-rule in TJnG. By the Induction Hypothesis,
TJn 
∧
J ∧∧→.
By T-reasoning,
TJn 
∧
J→(∧→).
By Lemma 4,
TJn 
∧
J→(∧→).
The ‘if’ direction for both S4Jn and TJn will be established in Corollary 1. 
Theorem 3 (Completeness Theorem). The following are equivalent:
1.  ⇒  is provable in S4JnG(TJnG) without cut;
2.  ⇒  is provable in S4JnG(TJnG);
3.
∧
→∨ is provable in S4Jn (TJn );
4.
∧
→∨ is S4Jn -valid (TJn -valid);
5.
∧
→∨ is valid in all ﬁnite S4Jn -models (TJn -models).
Proof. We will prove the case of S4Jn in detail. The case of TJn is treated similarly, and we will show what modiﬁcations
should be made in the S4Jn proof to make it work for TJn as well. Steps (1) ⇒ (2) and (4) ⇒ (5) are trivial, (2) ⇒
(3) ⇒ (4) has already been covered above. We will concentrate on proving that (5) ⇒ (1). As usual, for this sort of
proof we assume not (1) and establish not (5), i.e., given that 0 ⇒ 0 is not provable in S4JnG without cut, we build
a ﬁnite S4Jn -model M , such that at some node of M , all formulas from 0 hold and all formulas from 0 do not hold.
To keep the domain of a model ﬁnite, we will consider only formulas from a given ﬁnite set F of formulas closed
under subformulas and containing all formulas from the given sequent 0 ⇒ 0. We call a sequent  ⇒  consistent
if  ⇒  is not provable in S4JnG without cut. A sequent  ⇒  is called saturated if the following conditions hold:
⊥ ∈ ;
→ ∈  yields  ∈  or  ∈ ;
→ ∈  yields  ∈  and  ∈ ;
 ∈  yields  ∈  where  ∈ {K1, . . . , Kn, J }.
It is easy to see that any consistent sequent  ⇒  can be extended to a saturated consistent sequent by an obvious
terminating saturation procedure. If the original sequent  ⇒  contains only formulas from F , its saturation consists
of formulas from F too.
Deﬁne a model M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R,  ). W will be the (ﬁnite) set of all consistent saturated sequents. Let
 = {J|J ∈ } and i = {Ki|Ki ∈ }. Set
( ⇒ )R(′ ⇒ ′) iff  ⊆ ′, ( ⇒ )Ri(′ ⇒ ′) iff  ∪ i ⊆ ′.
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From this deﬁnition, all R1, . . . , Rn, R are reﬂexive and transitive, and Ri ⊆ R for all i = 1, . . . , n. For TJn we deﬁne
( ⇒ )Ri(′ ⇒ ′) iff  ∪ i ⊆ ′.
Obviously, those Ri’s are reﬂexive, but not necessarily transitive. Finally,
( ⇒ ) S iff S ∈  for a propositional letter S.
Lemma 5 (Truth Lemma).
1. If  ∈ , then ( ⇒ );
2. If  ∈ , then ( ⇒ ).
Proof. It is established by standard induction on . The base and the cases of Boolean connectives are trivial. Suppose
 = Ki. If Ki ∈ , and ′ ⇒ ′ is accessible from  ⇒  by Ri , then i ⊆ ′; hence Ki ∈ ′. By the
corresponding saturation property,  ∈ ′. By the Induction Hypothesis, (′ ⇒ ′); hence ( ⇒ )Ki.
Now let Ki ∈ . Then i , ⇒  is a consistent sequent, otherwise i , ⇒  would be derivable in S4JnG
without cut. By the (⇒,)-rule, i , ⇒ Ki would also be derivable in S4JnG without cut. Hence, by Weakening,
 ⇒  is derivable in S4JnG without cut, which contradicts our assumption of the consistency of  ⇒ . Consider a
saturated extension ′ ⇒ ′ of i , ⇒ . Since  ∈ ′, by the Induction Hypothesis, (′ ⇒ ′). Obviously,
(′ ⇒ ′) is accessible from ( ⇒ ) by Ri ; hence ( ⇒ )Ki. For TJn it sufﬁces to take a consistent sequent
i , ⇒  instead of i , ⇒ .
Suppose  = J. If J ∈ , and ′ ⇒ ′ is accessible from  ⇒  by R, then  ⊆ ′; hence J ∈ ′. By the
corresponding saturation property,  ∈ ′. By the Induction Hypothesis, (′ ⇒ ′); hence ( ⇒ ) J.
Let J ∈ . Then  ⇒  is a consistent sequent, otherwise  ⇒  would be derivable in S4JnG without cut.
By the (⇒,)-rule,  ⇒ J would also be derivable in S4JnG without cut; hence  ⇒  would be inconsistent.
Consider a saturated extension ′ ⇒ ′ of  ⇒ . Since  ∈ ′, by the Induction Hypothesis, (′ ⇒ ′). Since
(′ ⇒ ′) is accessible from ( ⇒ ) by R, ( ⇒ ) J. 
Here is the standard conclusion of the proof of Theorem 3. Let  ⇒  be a sequent not provable in S4JnG without
cut; hence consistent. Consider its saturated consistent extension ( ⇒ 	), which is an element of W. Since  ⊆ 
and  ⊆ 	, by Lemma 5, all formulas from  hold at ( ⇒ 	) and all formulas from  do not hold at ( ⇒ 	).
Hence ( ⇒ 	)∧→∨. 
Corollary 1.
1. Cut-elimination in S4JnG and TJnG.
2. Completeness of S4Jn for S4Jn -models and TJn for TJn -models.
3. Finite model property of S4Jn and TJn .
4. Decidability of S4Jn and TJn .
5. Equivalence of S4Jn to S4JnG and TJn to TJnG (Theorem 2).
Now we are ready to show that TJn and S4Jn are exactly the forgetful projections of TnLP and S4nLP, respectively,
deﬁned by a translation ( )◦ which maps t: to J and commutes with all other connectives.
Proposition 8. (TnLP)o ⊆ TJn and (S4nLP)o ⊆ S4Jn .
Proof. A straightforward induction on derivations in TnLP and S4nLP. It sufﬁces to observe that the forgetful
translations of all axioms and rules of TnLP and S4nLP are TJn - and S4Jn -compliant, respectively. 
The converse claim that TJn ⊆ (TnLP)o and S4Jn ⊆ (S4nLP)o is a much trickier.
Theorem 4 (Realization Theorem). There is an algorithm that given a TJn -derivation (S4Jn -derivation) of a formula
, returns a TnLP-derivation (S4nLP-derivation) of a formula  such that ()o = .
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Proof. First, ﬁnd a cut-free proof of a given formula in S4Jn (TJnG). Then run the realizability algorithm from [6],
Theorem 9.4, to retrieve evidence terms at every occurrence of the modality J in this derivation. Here is a brief
exposition of how the realization algorithm works. We consider S4Jn only; the case of TJn is quite similar.
We call a realization r of modality J in a given formula or sequent normal if all negative occurrences of J are realized
by evidence variables. We will speak about a sequent’s  ⇒  being derivable in S4Jn , meaning S4Jn 
∧
→∨
or, equivalently, S4JnG  ⇒ . Moreover, since S4Jn enjoys the deduction theorem, S4Jn derives  ⇒  iff   in
S4Jn iff S4JnG  ⇒ .
Consider a cut-free derivation T of a sequent ⇒  in S4JnG. It sufﬁces now to construct a normal realization r such
that S4nLP 
∧
r →∨r for any sequent  ⇒  in T . Note that in T , the rules respect polarities; all occurrences
of J introduced by (⇒,) are positive, and all negative occurrences are introduced by (,⇒) or by Weakening.
Occurrences of J are related if they occur in related formulas of premises and conclusions of rules; we extend this
relationship by transitivity. All occurrences of J in T are naturally split into disjoint families of related ones. We call
a family essential if it contains at least one instance of the (⇒, J ) rule where the modality J of this family has been
introduced. The desired r will be constructed by steps 1–3 described below. We reserve a sufﬁciently large set of
evidence variables as provisional variables.
Step 1: For every negative family and non-essential positive family, we replace all occurrences of J by ‘x:’ for a
fresh evidence variable x.
Step 2: Pick an essential family f, enumerate all the occurrences of rules (⇒, J ) which introduce the modality J of
this family. Let nf be the total number of such rules for the family f. Replace all boxes of the family f by the evidence
term
v1 + · · · + vnf ,
where vi’s are fresh provisional variables. The resulting tree T ′ is labelled by S4nLP-formulas, since all occurrences
of the kind J in T are replaced by t: for corresponding evidence terms t.
Step 3: Replace the provisional variables by evidence terms as follows. Proceed from the leaves of the tree to its
root. By induction on the depth of a node in T ′ we establish that after the process passes a node, the sequent assigned
to this node becomes derivable in S4nLP. The axioms S ⇒ S and ⊥ ⇒ are derivable in S4nLP. For every rule other
than (⇒, J ), we do not change the realization of formulas and just establish that the concluding sequent is provable in
S4nLP, given that the premises are. It is clear that every move down in the tree T ′ other than (⇒, J ) is derivable in
S4nLP. Let an occurrence of the rule (⇒, J ) have number i in the numbering of all rules (⇒, J ) from a given family
f. The corresponding node in T ′ is labelled by
y1:B1, . . . , yk:Bk ⇒ B
y1:B1, . . . , yk:Bk ⇒ (u1 + · · · + unf ):B
,
where y1, . . . , yk are evidence variables, u1, . . . , unf are evidence terms, and ui is a provisional variable. By the
Induction Hypothesis, the premise sequent y1 :B1, . . . , yk :Bk ⇒ B is derivable in S4nLP. By the Lifting Lemma
(Proposition 2), construct an evidence term t (y1, . . . , yk) such that
S4nLP  y1:B1, . . . , yk:Bk ⇒ t (y1, . . . , yk):B.
Since
S4nLP  t:B→(u1+· · ·+ui−1+t+ui+1+· · ·+unf ):B,
we have
S4nLP  y1:B1, . . ., yk:Bk ⇒ (u1+· · ·+ui−1+t+ui+1+· · ·+unf ):B.
Now substitute t (y1, . . . , yk) for ui everywhere in T ′ (and the corresponding constant speciﬁcation CS). Note that
t (y1, . . . , yk) has no provisional variables and that there is one less provisional variable (namely ui) in T ′. The
conclusion of the given rule (⇒, J ) becomes derivable in S4nLP, and the induction step is complete.
We eventually substitute terms of non-provisional variables for all provisional variables in T ′ and establish that the
root sequent of T ′ is derivable in S4nLP. The realization r built by this procedure is normal. 
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Note that the current version of the realization algorithm can produce evidence terms which are exponential in the
size of the original cut-free derivation in S4JnG. A more efﬁcient modiﬁcation of the realization algorithm for S4 was
described by Brezhnev and Kuznets in [15], where the realizing evidence terms are quadratic in the size of the original
cut-free derivation. It seems a similar approach could produce an efﬁcient realization algorithm for S4JnG and TJnG.
Realization for S5Jn needs a separate treatment.
Deﬁnition 7. S5Jn -models are the models from Deﬁnition 5 with reﬂexive, transitive, and symmetric relations
R1, . . . , Rn.
Theorem 5. S5Jn is sound and complete with respect to S5Jn -models.
Proof. The soundness portion is straightforward. In particular, J→Ki is trivially guaranteed by Ri ⊆ R.
The completeness part is accomplished by the standard maximal consistent set construction. A set  is consistent
if for any ﬁnite  ⊆ , S5Jn ¬(
∧
). W is a collection of all maximal consistent sets; Ri iff i ⊆ , R iff
 ⊆ , where  = {|J ∈ }. All Ri and R are reﬂexive and transitive. Let us check the inclusions Ri ⊆ R.
Suppose Ri and J ∈ . Since S5Jn  J→KiJ, J→KiJ ∈  and KiJ ∈ ; hence J ∈  and  ∈ .
Therefore R.
Moreover, each of Ri , i = 1, . . . , n is symmetric (hence each is an equivalence relation). Indeed, let Ri and
Ki ∈ . It sufﬁces to show that Ki ∈  (hence  ∈ ). Suppose Ki /∈ . Then ¬Ki ∈ . By the S5-axiom
¬Ki→Ki¬Ki, Ki¬Ki ∈ . Since i ⊆ , ¬Ki ∈  as well—a contradiction.
As usual,  S iff S ∈  for any sentence variable S. We have shown that the resulting construction (W,R1, . . . ,
Rn, R,  ) is an S5Jn -model.
The Truth Lemma says that for any formula ,
 iff  ∈ .
Its proof follows from standard induction on . Let us check the case when  = J. If J ∈ , then  ∈  for
all  such that R. By the Induction Hypothesis,  for all  such that R. Hence  J. If J /∈ , then
 ∪ {¬} is a consistent set. Otherwise, for some ﬁnite subset  of ,   and, by modal logic rules,   J;
hence J ∈ —a contradiction. Take a maximal consistent set  containing  ∪ {¬}. Apparently,  /∈ ; hence by
the Induction Hypothesis,  and  J.
Theorem 5 now follows immediately. 
Theorem 6. S5Jn is the forgetful projection of S5nLP, i.e., (S5nLP)o = S5Jn .
Proof. Again, the proof of (S5nLP)o ⊆ S5Jn is given by a straightforward induction on derivations in S5nLP.
The existence of anS5nLP-realization of any theorems ofS5Jn can be established semantically bymethods developed
in [18]. The main ingredients of Fitting’s semantical realizability proof are the Fully Explanatory property of S5nLP-
models with full constant speciﬁcations (Proposition 5) and the Compactness property (Proposition 4).
Deﬁnition 8. By S5nLP− we mean a system S5nLP in a language without ‘+’ and without axiom E3. Models of
S5nLP− are the same as for those of S5nLP except that the evidence function is not required to satisfy the Sum
condition. We may assume that S5nLP-models and S5nLP−-models are also models for S5Jn with R being an acces-
sibility relation for the modality J.
Note that such features as internalization and the Fully Explanatory property of the canonical model hold forS5nLP−
and S5nLP−-models as well.
Assume an S5Jn -formula  is ﬁxed for the rest of the proof of Theorem 6. By ‘subformula of ’ we will mean an
‘occurrence of a subformula of .’
Deﬁnition 9. Let A be any assignment of evidence variables to subformulas of  of the form J that are in a
negative position. We deﬁne two mappings wA and vA of subformulas of  to sets of formulas of S5nLP
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and S5nLP−, respectively.
(1) If P is an atomic formula (including ⊥), then wA(P ) = vA(P ) = {P }.
(2) wA(X→Y ) = {X′→Y ′|X′ ∈ wA(X) and Y ′ ∈ wA(Y )}.
vA(X→Y ) = {X′→Y ′|X′ ∈ vA(X) and Y ′ ∈ vA(Y )}.
(3) If KiX is a negative subformula of , then
wA(KiX) = {KiX′|X′ ∈ wA(X)},
vA(KiX) = {KiX′|X′ ∈ vA(X)}.
(4) If KiX is a positive subformula of , then
wA(KiX) = {KiX′|X′ ∈ wA(X)},
vA(KiX) = {Ki(X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk)|X1, . . . , Xk ∈ vA(X)}.
(5) If JX is a negative subformula of , then
wA(JX) = {x:X′|A(JX) = x and X′ ∈ wA(X)},
vA(JX) = {x:X′|A(JX) = x and X′ ∈ vA(X)}.
(6) If JX is a positive subformula of , then
wA(JX) = {t:X′|X′ ∈ wA(X) and t is any evidence term},
vA(JX) = {t:(X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk)|Xi ∈ vA(X) and t is any evidence term}.
By ¬vA(X) we mean {¬X′|X′ ∈ vA(X)}.
Lemma 6. Let CS be a full constant speciﬁcation of S5nLP− and M be a canonical model for S5nLP− that meets
CS. Then for each world  of M:
1. If  is a positive subformula of , then ¬vA() yields ¬.
2. If  is a negative subformula of , then  vA() yields .
Proof. Induction on . The atomic case as well as the cases of Boolean connectives are straightforward (cf. [18,
Proposition 7.7]).
Suppose  is KiX,  is a positive subformula of , ¬vA(KiX); and the result is known for X (which also
occurs positively in ). We show that i ∪ ¬vA(X) is consistent. Indeed, otherwise i X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk for some
X1, . . . , Xk ∈ vA(X). By the Ki-necessitation rule,  Ki(X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk). Hence Ki(X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk), which
is impossible since Ki(X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk) ∈ vA(KiX). Now, extend i ∪ ¬vA(X) to a maximal consistent , which
is therefore a world in M accessible from  by Ri . Since ¬vA(X) ⊆ , ¬vA(X). By the Induction Hypothesis,
¬X. Therefore, ¬KiX.
Suppose  is KiX,  is a negative subformula of ,  vA(KiX), and the result is known for X (which also occurs
negatively in ). In particular, KiX′ for each X′ ∈ vA(X). Let  be an arbitrary world such that Ri. Then
X′; hence  vA(X). By the Induction Hypothesis, X. Therefore, KiX.
Suppose is JX, is a positive subformula of,¬vA(JX), and the result is known forX (which also occurs posi-
tively in).We show that∪¬vA(X) is consistent. Indeed, otherwise, by compactness, {Y1, . . . , Ym,¬X1, . . . ,¬Xk}
is inconsistent for some Y1, . . . , Ym ∈  and X1, . . . , Xk ∈ vA(X). This means that
S5nLP− Y1→(Y2 →· · ·→(Ym→X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk) . . .).
By internalization, there is an evidence term s such that
S5nLP−  s:[Y1→(Y2 →· · ·→(Ym→X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk) . . .)].
Consider evidence terms t1, t2, . . . , tm such that t1:Y1, t2:Y2, . . . , tm:Ym ∈ . By E1 and propositional reasoning,
S5nLP−  t1:Y1 ∧ t2:Y2 ∧ · · · ∧ tm:Ym→(st1t2 . . . tm):[X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk].
Hence  (st1t2 . . . tm):[X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk], which is impossible since (st1t2 . . . tm):[X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xk] ∈ vA(JX).
Let  be a maximal consistent extension of  ∪ ¬vA(X). Obviously, R and ¬vA(X). By the Induction
Hypothesis, ¬X; hence ¬JX.
Suppose  is JX,  is a negative subformula of ,  vA(JX), and the result is known for X (which also occurs
negatively in ). Let X′ be an arbitrary element of vA(X). Then  x:X′, where x is an evidence variable assigned to
this occurrence JX by the mapping A. For any world  such that R, X′. By the Induction Hypothesis, X.
Therefore,  JX. 
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Now suppose S5Jn  but S5nLP−  (1 ∨ · · · ∨ m) for all 1, . . . ,m ∈ vA() with a given full constant
speciﬁcationCS. Then every ﬁnite subset of¬vA() is satisﬁable. By compactness (Proposition 4) adapted to S5nLP−,
there is a world in the canonical model for S5nLP− withCS such that¬vA(). By Lemma 6,¬. Therefore,
since S5Jn , there are 1, . . . ,m ∈ vA() such that S5nLP−  (1 ∨ · · · ∨ m).
Lemma 7. For every subformula  of  and each 1, . . . ,m ∈ vA(), there is a substitution 
 of evidence terms for
evidence variables and a formula ′ ∈ wA() such that:
1. If  is a positive subformula of , S5nLP  (1 ∨ · · · ∨ m)
→′.
2. If  is a negative subformula of , S5nLP ′→(1 ∧ · · · ∧ m)
.
Proof. We use the fact that evidence variables assigned to different (occurrences of) subformulas J in  are all
different. Induction on . Again, the atomic case as well as the cases of Boolean connectives are straightforward
(cf. [18, Proposition 7.8]).
Suppose  is KiX,  is a positive subformula of , and the result is known for X (which also occurs positively
in). LetKiD1, . . . , KiDm ∈ vA(KiX). ThoseD1, . . . , Dm are disjunctions of formulas from vA(X). By the Induction
Hypothesis, there is a substitution 
 and X′ ∈ wA(X) such that S5nLP  (D1 ∨ · · · ∨ Dm)
→X′. Consequently, for
each j = 1, . . . , m, S5nLP Dj
→X′. By necessitation, S5nLP Ki(Dj
→X′); hence S5nLP KiDj
→KiX′.
Therefore, S5nLP  (KiD1 ∨ · · · ∨ KiDm)
→KiX′.
Suppose  is KiX,  is a negative subformula of , and the result is known for X (which also occurs negatively
in ). Let KiX1, . . . , KiXm ∈ vA(KiX). By the Induction Hypothesis, there is a substitution 
 and X′ ∈ wA(X) such
that S5nLP X′→(X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xm)
. By necessitation, S5nLP KiX′→Ki(X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xm)
. Since Ki commutes
with 
 and ∧, S5nLP KiX′→(KiX1 ∧ · · · ∧ KiXm)
.
Suppose  is JX,  is a positive subformula of , and the result is known for X (which also occurs positively in ).
In this case 1, . . . ,m ∈ vA() are of the form t1 :D1, . . . , tm :Dm, where each of D1, . . . , Dm is a disjunction of
formulas from vA(X). By the Induction Hypothesis, there is a substitution 
 and X′ ∈ wA(X) such that S5nLP  (D1 ∨
· · · ∨ Dm)
→X′.
Consequently, for each j = 1, . . . , m, S5nLP Dj
→ X′. By internalization, there is an evidence term sj such
that S5nLP  sj :(Dj
→X′). Then S5nLP  (tj :Dj)
→ (sj · tj
):X′. Set t = (s1 · t1
) + · · · + (sm · tm
). We have
S5nLP  (tj:Dj)
→ t:X′, and hence S5nLP  (t1:D1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm:Dm)
→ t:X′.
Suppose  is JX,  is a negative subformula of , and the result is known for X (which also occurs negatively
in ). In this case 1, . . . ,m ∈ vA() are of the form x:X1, . . . , x:Xm, where each of X1, . . . , Xm is from vA(X).
By the Induction Hypothesis, there is a substitution 
 and X′ ∈ wA(X) such that S5nLP X′ → (X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xm)
.
Since the variable x is not assigned by A to any of subformulas of X, we may assume that x is not in the domain of 
.
From the above, it follows that S5nLP X′ → Xj
. By internalization, S5nLP  tj :(X′ → Xj
) for some evidence
term tj . Therefore, S5nLP  s:(X′→Xj
) for s = t1 + · · · + tm. Furthermore, S5nLP  x:X′→ (s ·x):(Xj
) for each
j = 1, . . . , m. For the substitution 
′ = 
 ∪ {x/(s ·x)}, S5nLP  x:X′→ (x:X1 ∧ · · · ∧ x:Xm)
′, which completes the
proof of Lemma 7. 
To conclude the proof of Theorem 6, assume that S5Jn . Then there are 1, . . . ,m ∈ vA() such that
S5nLP− 1∨· · ·∨m. By Lemma 7, there is a substitution 
 and′ ∈ wA() such that S5nLP  (1∨· · ·∨m)
→
′. Since S5nLP is closed under substitution, S5nLP ′. 
Theorem 6 yields an algorithm that given S5Jn -theorem , retrieves a S5nLP-theorem  such that ()o = .
Indeed, arrange an enumeration of all S5nLP-realizations of  and their proof searches in S5nLP. By Theorem 6,
this process should terminate with success. A question of ﬁnding an efﬁcient realization algorithm for S5Jn remains
open.
The results of this section show that the justiﬁed knowledge J in JCK-systems TJn , S4Jn , and S5Jn is indeed the
forgetful version of evidence-based knowledge in the corresponding EBK-systems. Using JCK-systems (i.e., forgetful
EBK-systems) instead of the original EBK-systems makes sense, since the former are conventional multi-modal logics
which are easier to work with. On the other hand, EBK-systems have a solid justiﬁcation, which can be extended to
the corresponding JCK-systems. In particular, in light of [3] this provides an EBK-semantics for the McCarthy’s ‘any
fool’ agent from [32].
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Note that models for TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP are also models for TJn , S4Jn , and S5Jn , respectively. It sufﬁces to
regard the evidence accessibility relation R in models for TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP as the accessibility relation for J.
7. Justiﬁed vs. common knowledge
In this section, we compare justiﬁed knowledge systems and common knowledge systems. First of all, we recall
that the justiﬁed knowledge part in JCK-systems can be chosen independently of the knowledge system for individual
agents, whereas the common knowledge operators are determined by the individual knowledge systems for the agents.
Therefore, justiﬁed common knowledge systems cover more situations than the common knowledge systems. When
both systems are present, e.g., in the case of S4Jn and S4Cn , it is fair to compare them.
Operators C and J can be compared model-theoretically. Each S4Cn -model is an S4Jn -model, but not the other way
around, since the evidence accessibility in S4Jn -models contains (but not necessarily coincides with) the reachability on
the frame (W,R1, . . . , Rn). We could, however, impose a structure of an S4Cn -model on any S4Jn -model by adding the
reachability relation for the operator C, which is done in a unique way for a given S4Jn -model. The resulting models M
support the languages of both S4Cn and S4Jn , thus providing a reasonable context for comparing knowledge operators
C and J. The logic S4JCn is the set of tautologies in the language containing K1, . . . , Kn, J, C.
Proposition 9. Justiﬁed common knowledge is stronger than common knowledge, i.e., 1. J→C is valid; 2. C→
J is not valid.
Proof. 1. This obviously follows, since the common knowledge accessibility is a subset of the evidence accessibility.
2. For a counterexample, take W = {a, b}, Ri = {(a, a), (a, b), (b, b)}, RJ = Ri ∪{(b, a)}. Then the transitive closure
of all Ri will be the same Ri . Consider a forcing relation such that a S and b S for some sentence variable S. In
this setup, bC(S), but b J (S). 
This baby example demonstrates, however, the main model-theoretical difference between common knowledge and
evidence-based knowledge: the former captures the greatest solution of the Fixed-Point common knowledge equation
C ↔ E( ∧ C), whereas the latter considers all of its solutions.
To compare valid principles of common knowledge and evidence-based knowledge, consider a syntactic transfor-
mation ∗ that converts all occurrences of J into C.
Proposition 10. Each JCK-principle is a common knowledge principle but not vice versa i.e., (S4Jn )∗ ⊂ S4Cn .
Proof. For (S4Jn )∗ ⊆ S4Cn , it sufﬁces to prove the ∗-translations of all the axioms and rules of S4Jn in S4Cn .
Let us check, for example, the necessitation rule for J: S4Jn  ⇒ S4Jn  J. Suppose S4Cn ∗, then S4Cn  →
E(∗). Use the Induction Rule of S4Cn (cf. [17]) to conclude that S4Cn C∗, i.e., S4Cn  (J)∗. The remaining cases
can be recovered by inspecting [17].
To show the remaining part of the claim, consider a valid S4Cn principle
 ∧ C(→E)→C,
and notice that its J version IP =  ∧ J (→ E) → J is not valid for S4Jn . Indeed, consider the same model
as in the proof of Proposition 9.2, and pick  such that a, but b. Then b J (→ E), since at each node
where  holds (b only), E also does (b is the only node accessible from b by agent’s relations R1, . . . , Rn). Hence
b ∧ J (→E). On the other hand, a, bRa; hence b J. 
8. Wise Men puzzle via justiﬁed knowledge
In this section, we present a small example of using justiﬁed knowledge. Namely, we give a solution to the Wise
Men puzzle (cf. [17, p. 12]) as a derivation in the justiﬁed knowledge system TJ3 .
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There are certain advantages in such kinds of solutions. A high degree of formalization eliminates hidden semantical
assumptions typical for a traditional solution of this type of problem by reasoning on a designated Kripke model.
The deductive solution to the Wise Men puzzle below is carried within TJ3 which assumes the minimal T as the logic of
knowledge for agents, and modest S4 as the justiﬁcation system, whereas the traditional solutions routinely use much
more involved and problematic S5 as agent’s knowledge and S5 extended by the Induction Rule for the Common
Knowledge.
The Wise Men story is as follows:
There are three wise men. It is common knowledge that there are three red hats and two white hats. The king puts
a hat on the head of each of the three wise men, and asks them (sequentially) if they know the color of the hat on
their head. The ﬁrst wise man says that he does not know, the second wise man says that he does not know, then
the third wise man says that he knows.
(a) What color is the third wise man’s hat?
(b) Suppose the third wise man is blind and that it is common knowledge that the ﬁrst two wise men can see.
Can the third wise man still ﬁgure out the color of his hat?
The solution below consists of a formal derivation in TJ3 . Let atomic propositions pi stand for ‘wise man i has a red
hat’ (i = 1, 2, 3), Let also Kwi be a shorthand for Ki∨Ki¬, i.e., ‘i knows whether .’ The assumption that each
wise man observes the other wise men’s hats is represented by the additional axioms ‘Knowing About the Others,’ or
‘K.A.O.’ for short:
K.A.O. = ∧
j 
=i
Kwjpi.
The rules of the game can be described by the theory
L(0) = TJ3 + J (K.A.O.) + J (¬000).
The situation after the ﬁrst and second wise men said they did not know is represented by a theory
L(2) = L(0) + J (¬Kw1p1) + J (¬Kw2p2).
Lemma 8. L(2)  Jp3.
Proof. We now have a comfortable choice of methods ranging from model reasoning to all sorts of proof systems,
including Gentzen-style ones. We will present a concise Hilbert-style derivation in L(2) which directly formalizes a
natural, ‘human’ solution. First, we prove in L(2) that J (¬100).
1. 100→K1(¬p2 ∧ ¬p3), from J (K.A.O.);
2. K1(¬p2 ∧ ¬p3)→K1p1, from J (¬000);
3. 100→K1p1, from 1 and 2;
4. ¬Kw1p1→¬100, from 3;
5. J (¬Kw1p1)→J (¬100), from 4, by TJ3 -reasoning;
6. J (¬100), from J (¬Kw1p1) and 5.
Likewise, using J (¬Kw2p2) we obtain J (¬010). Next, we prove in L(2) that J (¬110).
1. 110→K2(110 ∨ 100), from J (K.A.O.);
2. 110→K2(110), since J (¬100);
3. 110→Kw2p2, by TJ3 -reasoning;
4. ¬Kw2p2 →¬110, by propositional logic;
5. J (¬Kw2p2)→J (¬110), by TJ3 -reasoning;
6. J (¬110), from J (¬Kw2p2) and 5.
Finally, we conclude Jp3, since it is common knowledge that all truth combinations with ¬p3 have been ruled out. 
From the above proof it is also clear that the Wise Man 3 wears a red hat, and he will know this after the answers of
1 and 2, even without seeing their hats. Indeed, the above reasoning does not use Kw3p1 and Kw3p2.
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